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On Quantum Theory
Rudolf Haag
Abstract
A discussion of fundamental aspects of quantum theory is presented,
stressing the essential role of “events”.1
1 Metaphysics
Looking superficially at so many shelves with books and journals in a
physics library we recognize already some basic features.
First: Physics is a collective enterprise needing exchange between
many human individuals. Each person experiences sensations regis-
tered in his conscious mind. And the remarkable thing is that we can
communicate with others and find a consensus about some part of
such impressions. The recognition of other persons with minds inde-
pendent of ours together with the possibility of communicating with
them suggests that we are small parts of a huge world which we call
nature or the universe, most of which we assume to be disjoint from
human consciousness. The complement of conscious minds we call the
outside world.
Since everything we can ever know rests ultimately in the con-
sciousness of our minds, there is the question stressed in idealistic
philosophy as to whether the assumption of an outside world is su-
perfluous. Pursuing this we may arrive at the idea of a universal
consciousness constituting the universe. Such philosophical endeavors
must be understood as the search for a metaphysical model appropri-
ate to the motivation of our actions. In the fields of fine arts, music,
religion, the emphasis on the primary role of consciousness is natu-
ral, it does, however, not provide the motivation for natural sciences,
particularly not for experimental physics.
1Abstract by Erhard Seiler (see afterword)
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Here we take the dualistic or realistic point of view assuming two
separate realms: the outside world on the one hand, and conscious-
ness on the other. This was the driving motivation of experimental
physicists. Between the outside world and consciousness there is an
interaction in both directions. On the one hand, there is the action of
the outside world on us, causing impressions. On the other hand, the
action from us on the outside world, producing a change there subject
to our will. This is essential for physics proper, involving the planning
and setting up of experiments and recognizing that the senses of touch
and vision could be replaced and refined by instruments called detec-
tors. We shall call the response of such a detector a (coarse) event.
An important feature in this context is the possibility of creating doc-
uments of such events, which may be studied much later by anybody
interested.
Let us make it clear that we do not imply that one or the other
of these metaphysical models is true or false. We take recourse to the
“Philosophie des Als ob” (Philosophy of “as if”) by Hans Vaihinger.
(allowing any view as long as it is not contradicted...).
Second: “divisibility”. Any gain of knowledge starts with (needs)
the distinction of different things: different individuals of any kind.
Our ability to distinguish different elements leads us to the concept
of numbers, sets, from which the whole structure of mathematics ulti-
mately is built. Moreover, the recurrent appearance of simple parts of
impressions leads us to assign symbols (words) to them, resulting in
the development of language and the ability to communicate with oth-
ers about our impressions. In the quasi-static case (e.g. a tree stands
before my window) the symbol tree stands for a common element rec-
ognizable in an almost continuous succession of impressions, thereby
integrating all of them into a single concept. We instinctively associate
with the symbol tree an element of the outside world, interacting with
our consciousness and causing the impression. The assumed element
of the outside world responsible for such an impression is called an
object. Typically it may be a piece of matter registered by our sense
of touch or a ray of light interacting with our retina. The motivation
for considering an object as an element of the outside world is: we
can control the appearance by opening or closing our eyes, approach
it with different senses, we can discuss it with our neighbors. In addi-
tion it satisfies our deeply rooted urge for causality, the demand that
the impression of the tree should have a cause.
Throughout centuries of physics and chemistry the classification of
stable objects, the structure of matter, has been pursued with enor-
mous success. As the description progressed towards finer and finer
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features, the visualization of objects became more and more fuzzy, so
that the concept of objects no longer appears to provide a suitable
basis in theory. Much closer to reality is the concept of an event,
marking the result of an interaction process. In quantum physics, it
marks the transition from a possibility to a fact. Its salient proper-
ties are irreversibility and an approximate localization in space and
time, which provides the basis for our analysis of geometric relations
in space-time.
For each person the primary phenomena (registered events) form
a well-ordered sequence in time. The sequence is steadily growing.
The last phenomenon in this sequence is of a special character, it is
the only one felt directly. It marks the subjective present, the earlier
ones are guarded in the memory or in records, the later ones are not
(yet) existing. The present divides time into past and future. The
past consists of unchangeable facts, the future is open.
Any statements about future events depend on inductive reasoning.
Observations of regularities in the occurrence of past events have led
to the formulation of laws of nature. We stipulate that these will hold
in the future. Thus, they allow us to make predictions about coming
phenomena.
In classical theory the laws are strictly deterministic, i.e. precise
knowledge of objects and events in the past (unattainable in practice)
would enable us to make precise predictions for the development in the
future. Moreover it is widely believed that these laws satisfy complete
symmetry between past and future (time reversal invariance); we shall
return to this later.
In quantum theory past history does not allow to predict the fu-
ture; the past determines only probabilities of future events. Further-
more, the observation of an event does not allow us to make retro-
dictions of probabilities of past events (see Appendix A). This has
some bearing on the question of reversibility, as discussed in the next
section.
2 Irreversibility
The irreversibility of all naturally occurring processes is a general ex-
perience. This is most strikingly evident in biological processes (the
development of organisms between birth and death is obviously uni-
directional). But it is also omnipresent in physics and expressed there
by the second law of thermodynamics. The reconciliation of this law
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with the generally assumed time reversal invariance of the basic laws
of nature in classical physics is the challenge addressed by statisti-
cal mechanics. There, Boltzmann attributed to a macroscopic state
a thermodynamic probability reflecting the number of different real-
izations of this macroscopic appearance by microscopic configurations.
He interpreted this probability as the logarithm of the “entropy, whose
growth with increasing time is stipulated in the second law of ther-
modynamics. These probabilities differ enormously between various
macroscopic states and it is plausible to expect that under many cir-
cumstances the macroscopic body will change its state to one with
higher thermodynamic probability in the passage of time.
This is for instance so in laboratory physics, where the experimen-
talist sets the initial time at which a situation far from equilibrium
(i.e. with low probability) is artificially created. It is also illustrated
by dissipative effects, where typically a simple physical system de-
scribable by a few degrees of freedom begins to share energy with
many untraceable degrees of freedom. Boltzmanns argument by itself,
however, does not suffice to justify the second law of thermodynamics.
The differences in thermodynamic probability between various macro-
scopic states by themselves do not logically imply any distinction be-
tween past and future. We have to put in the additional information
that at the beginning we start with a state of low probability.
Irrespective of this, our above remarks about events in quantum
physics point to a more elementary justification of irreversibility. We
started with phenomena directly registered in our conscious mind and
observed their sequential character leading to the psychological arrow
of time. We then related these mental impressions to events. We shall
show in the next section that the growth of the entropy is directly
connected to the occurrence of events. Therefore, the thermodynamic
arrow of time is coupled to the psychological arrow. We can adapt
this argument to the case of classical physics. The notion of event
must there be replaced by that of a process in which originally in-
dependent and distinguishable objects begin to interact, wiping out
their distinguishability.
We sometimes wonder why the dogma of time reversal invariance
of the fundamental laws is so firmly entrenched, since it is not al-
ways clear what should be regarded as a fundamental law. In classical
physics there is at least one aspect of dissipation that is of a funda-
mental nature. This is the radiation damping associated with any
acceleration of a charged particle. In spite of Diracs beautiful anal-
ysis [1] and many subsequent elaborations such as [2]) no formula-
tion free from objections exists. Thus, strictly speaking, no complete
4
self-consistent classical theory uniting mechanics and electrodynamics
exists.
In Quantum Physics this is related to the infra-red problem and
leads to the observation that the causal shadow of each event is its
forward light cone. This leads to a formulation of the dynamics in
terms of a semi-group shifting light cones inside each other, as worked
out by Buchholz and Roberts [3].
The strongest argument for the belief in time reversal invariance is
the CPT theorem [footnote: T stands for Time reversal, C for Charge
conjugation, P for space reflection], which states that in any quan-
tum field theory satisfying the standard axioms there exists a CPT
operator, implying that the equations of motion are CPT invariant.
But, these equations of motion do not tell us what actually happens.
They only describe the development of the so-called quantum state,
which determines the probability for the realization of different possi-
ble events. To arrive at facts (individual events) we must add to these
equations the statistical interpretation of the quantum state, which in
our context we might call the principle of random realization ([4]).
It is this principle which destroys time reversal invariance and
unites the various arrows of time discussed in the literature. To repeat
the main line of our reasoning: we started with phenomena directly
registered in our conscious mind and observed their sequential charac-
ter leading to the psychological arrow of time. We then related these
mental impressions to events, namely interaction processes which may
be attributed to an outside world, and transported the sequential char-
acter from the phenomena to the events. Irreversibility happens in
the transition from a possibility to a fact, which in quantum physics
is governed by the principle of random realization, whereas in classical
physics the state itself is supposed to describe reality and its determin-
istic propagation leaves no room for a distinction between possibilities
and facts.
3 Standard Questions and Procedure
3.1 Observables
One decisive difference between the classical and quantum descrip-
tions of nature is seen in the following statement of Niels Bohr: “We
cannot assign any conventional attributes to an atomic object”. As
“conventional” we may regard an attribute describable numerically.
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Of course there are defining properties of an object, such as mass and
charge of an electron; but beyond this in classical physics we imag-
ine that an object may appear in variable states, for instance that a
particle has a definite position at any given time. Bohr’s statement
negates this.
Instead of attributes of an object one uses the concept of observ-
ables. This corresponds to the idea that one can carry through vari-
ous measurements on an object, each of them leading to a numerical
value, the observational result. The difference is that before the mea-
surement no definite numerical value is assignable to the object. This
value arises only by the interaction between the object and the mea-
suring device. Every single observed value has to be considered a fact.
As such it is irreversible, usually approximately localized in space and
time; thus it corresponds to what we called an event above.
As a simple example of an object let us consider an electron. One
possible observable is its position at a given time. It may be observed
as a dot appearing at that time on a scintillation screen. This cannot
be regarded as the position of the electron before the measurement,
but is created by the interaction between the electron and the screen.
The coordinates of this dot are not attributes of the electron but
attributes of the interaction event.
A more interesting example is to choose as observable the inter-
nal energy of an atom. The possible measuring values are the energy
levels of the electrons in the atom. These will manifest themselves by
spectral lines corresponding to frequencies of the emitted light, which
are proportional to energy differences. These frequencies in turn may
be determined for instance by letting the light pass through a diffrac-
tion grating and recording the outcome on a photographic plate. Thus
the observation of energy levels ultimately again leads to a position
measurement. We may note that in the last resort observations always
terminate in a position measurement, since they record the location
of an event.
The theoretical description uses the mathematics of Hilbert space.
An observable is represented by a self-adjoint operator. These op-
erators have a spectral resolution, i.e. spectral values and spectral
projectors; the former are interpreted as possible measuring values.
The second characteristic feature of quantum physics is its lack
of determinism. It only yields statistical predictions for the outcome
of observations. These are governed by the so-called quantum state
which is mathematically represented by a positive operator ρ of unit
trace, called the statistical operator. The probability of finding a
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measuring value in an interval [a, b] is given by tr(ρ P[a,b]), where P[a,b]
denotes the spectral projector for the interval [a,b] and ρ describes the
quantum state before observation.
Since the theory yields only statistical predictions we need for
checking them an ensemble of copies of equally prepared objects and
we estimate probabilities by relative frequencies of occurrence. The
realistic ensemble used in this test is idealized to a Gibbsian ensemble
of infinitely many independent copies.
3.2 Geometry of quantum states; composition
and decomposition of systems; entanglement
On the mathematical side the set of positive operators with unit trace
is a convex set which means that for any two such operators ρ1, ρ2
all the convex combinations λρ1 + (1 − λ)ρ2 with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 belong
again to this set. This corresponds to the possibility of mixing the
two ensembles with weights λ, 1− λ, respectively.
The convex body of states has extremal points, the “pure states”
which cannot be written as convex combinations of others. They are
represented by one-dimensional projectors or equivalently by the rays
in Hilbert space on which these project. In Quantum Mechanics of
particles the wave function describes such a ray. The salient feature
of quantum physics is that the convex body of states is not a simplex.
Thus, while an arbitrary state can be written as a convex combina-
tion of pure states, this decomposition is highly nonunique. In phys-
ical terms the decomposition of a state into a convex combination
corresponds to a decomposition of the ensemble into subensembles.
Therefore it is often not possible or meaningful to assume that each
individual system is in some pure state. The assignment of a particu-
lar pure state to an individual system means only that this system is
filed as a member of a particular subensemble whose choice remains
to some extent arbitrary.
This nonuniqueness has been the source of long disputes beginning
with the EPR “paradoxon” [6], the concept of entanglement between
states introduced by Schro¨dinger [7], the inequalities by Bell [8] and
Clauser et al [9] and their subsequent experimental study by Aspect
[10, 11] and many later experiments.
For this discussion we must consider general systems composed of
several subsystems. The Hilbert space associated with such a system
is taken to be the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the subsys-
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tems which compose it. Its set of quantum states contains “product
states” ρ(1)⊗ρ(2)⊗ ... and convex combinations thereof, called separa-
ble states, which describe correlations well known in classical statistics.
These types of states do not, however, exhaust all possibilities. For
instance, the pure states of the compound system are by definition
not convex combinations of any other states, hence they cannot be
separable unless they are just product states. States which are not
separable are called “entangled”. The statistical predictions for such
entangled states cannot be described in terms of correlations between
individual states of the subsystems. A simple illustration of this fea-
ture is afforded by a thought experiment suggested by Bohm [12] and
analysed in [8] and [9]:
A spin-0 particle decays into two spin-1/2 particles moving in op-
posite directions for a long time till one of them enters the lab of Alice,
the other one the lab of Bob. In both cases the arriving particle is
subjected to a measurement of the spin orientation by a Stern-Gerlach
arrangement. This can yield two possible outcomes: parallel or an-
tiparallel to the orientation of the Stern-Gerlach magnet. We denote
this result by (a, α), where a is the unit vector describing the direc-
tion of the magnet; α = ±1 distinguishes the two possible results. The
spin-part of the two-particle wave-function after the decay is a singlet
state and this will remain so practically unchanged up to the detec-
tion process. This singlet state is a pure entangled two-particle state
and one can show that it is impossible to assign any “conventional
attributes” (“hidden variables”) nor even a quantum state to the in-
dividual particles. The former impossibility has been demonstrated
in [8] , the latter in [9] .We shall follow here the arguments of [9], as
presented in [13].
The ensemble of all particles received by Bob may be describerd
by an impure one-particle quantum state ρB . Since the twin particles
are correlated due to their common birth it is not surprising that the
probability for a particular measuring results of Bob is correlated with
the result of Alice’s measuremant on the twin. However, entanglement
is more than ordinary correlation.
Suppose now that a particle is endowed with some objective prop-
erty λ (which may be a quantum state or a conventional attribute)
and the joint probability in the ensemble of pairs of particles is given
by a distribution function f(λ1, λ2) which describes ordinary correla-
tion between λ1 and λ2. We assume further that λ determines the
probability w(λ;a, α) for the measuring result (a, α), yielding the ex-
pectation value conditioned on λ
〈a;λ〉 = w(λ;a,+) − w(λ;a,−) . (1)
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We note that w(λ;a,+)+w(λ;a,−) = 1 because in the measurement
of a, one of the alternatives ±1 must occur. The joint probability for
(a, α;b, β) is then
W (a, α;b, β) =
∫
dλ1dλ2f(λ1, λ2)w(λ1;a, α)w(λ2;b, β) . (2)
For the expectation value in the joint measurement, which is defined
by
〈a;b〉 ≡W (a,+;b,+)−W (a,+;b,−)−W (a,−;b,+)+W (a,−;b,−)
(3)
one obtains the representation
〈a;b〉 =
∫
dλ1dλ2f(λ1, λ2)〈a;λ1〉〈b;λ2〉 . (4)
From this together with the positivity and normalization of the distri-
bution function f(λ1, λ2) one obtains inequalities between expectation
values for combinations of measurements with different orientations of
the apparatuses,
|〈a;b〉+ 〈a;b′〉|+ |〈a′;b〉 − 〈a′;b′〉| ≤ 2 . (5)
The experimentally observed violation of this inequality shows that
the assumption of an ordinary correlation between assumed properties
λ1, λ2 is not tenable. Instead one has the following situation: if Bob
receives the information from Alice about what she has done and found
in her measurements, he can split his ensemble into two subensembles
according to Alice’s measureing result α = ±1 on the twin. Then
these subsensembles define two orthogonal pure states which depend
on the orientation of Alice’s device. It must be stressed that this
has nothing to do with any physical effect of Alice’s measurement
on the particles received by Bob. Nor is it important how fast the
information is transmitted. Bob and Alice can get together leisurely
after the experiments are finished to evaluate their records. They only
have to establish the correct pairing of the events, which can be found
for example from the records of the arrival times. No witchcraft is
involved. It shows, however, that the pure state of the particle has no
objective significance. It does not describe a property of the individual
particle but only the defining information about the subensemble in
which the particle is filed. And here this is determined by the result
of Alices’s measurement on the twin.
This implies an enhancement of Bohr’s tenet mentioned in the in-
troduction. Not only can we “not assign any conventional attribute to
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an atomic object” but we cannot even assign any individual quantum
state to the particle. It puts in question the traditional picure of the
reality of “atomic object” (particles). Nicholas Maxwell has coined the
term “Propensiton” for such an object [14]. It propagates according to
a deterministic law such as the Schro¨dinger equation which is invari-
ant under time reversal. But it does not represent any phenomenon.
It is the carrier of propensity contributing to probability assignments.
A Temporal asymmetry of quantum
probabilities
For simplicity we consider here only two ‘observables’ A,B given by
self-adjoint operators with simple discrete spectrum. Assume that in a
state ρ first A, then B is measured. Let pα be the probability that the
measurement of A yields the spectral value α, pαβ the probability that
the consecutive measurement of B then yields β. We have, according
to the Lu¨ders rule [5]
pα = tr(Pαρ), pαβ = tr(QβPα ρPαQβ) . (6)
Using the assumptions about the spectra we have
PαρPα = Pαtr(ρPα) (7)
and hence, using the cyclicity of the trace
pαβ = tr(PαQβ)tr(Pαρ) = |〈α|β〉|
2〈α|ρ|α〉 = pα|〈α|β〉|
2 . (8)
The last formula shows already the asymmetry between the two mea-
surements.
More explicitly, when α has been measured, the probability of
finding β afterwards is known and given by that formula; if, on the
other hand, we only know that β has been measured in the second
step, the probability that the first measurement yielded α cannot be
inferred unless |α〉 = |β〉 (in which case it is 1).
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Afterword2
Rudolf Haag worked on this manuscript since the spring of 2013 until
just a few weeks before his death on January 5th, 2016. It evolved
in numerous discussions with me as well as Heide Narnhofer and
Berge Englert. Technical help was also provided by Albert Haag and
Friedrich Haag. But I should stress that the thoughts and the wording
are entirely due to Rudolf Haag.
Obviously the paper has not been completed; among the further
issues that Rudolf wanted to address were
• Partition of the universe, classification and reality of objects,
reductionism and its possible limits;
• Indistinguishability of particles; distinguishability of particles as
connections between events;
• Space and time, symmetries and invariances.
2by Erhard Seiler (Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Physik, Mu¨nchen, Germany, e-mail:
ehs@mpp.mpg.de)
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